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Abstract: A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a combination of physical system components with
cyber capabilities that have a very tight interconnectivity. CPS is a widely used technology in many
applications, including electric power systems, communications, and transportation, and healthcare
systems. These are critical national infrastructures. Cybersecurity attack is one of the major threats for
a CPS because of many reasons, including complexity and interdependencies among various system
components, integration of communication, computing, and control technology. Cybersecurity
attacks may lead to various risks affecting the critical infrastructure business continuity, including
degradation of production and performance, unavailability of critical services, and violation
of the regulation. Managing cybersecurity risks is very important to protect CPS. However,
risk management is challenging due to the inherent complex and evolving nature of the CPS system
and recent attack trends. This paper presents an integrated cybersecurity risk management framework
to assess and manage the risks in a proactive manner. Our work follows the existing risk management
practice and standard and considers risks from the stakeholder model, cyber, and physical system
components along with their dependencies. The approach enables identification of critical CPS assets
and assesses the impact of vulnerabilities that affect the assets. It also presents a cybersecurity attack
scenario that incorporates a cascading effect of threats and vulnerabilities to the assets. The attack
model helps to determine the appropriate risk levels and their corresponding mitigation process.
We present a power grid system to illustrate the applicability of our work. The result suggests that
risk in a CPS of a critical infrastructure depends mainly on cyber-physical attack scenarios and the
context of the organization. The involved risks in the studied context are both from the technical and
nontechnical aspects of the CPS.
Keywords: cybersecurity; risk management; cyber-physical systems; cybersecurity attack scenario;
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems; cascading effect
1. Introduction
Generally, cyber-physical systems are real-time and robust independent systems with
high performances requirements [1]. They are used in many application domains, including
critical infrastructures, such as the national power grid, transportation, medical, and defense.
These applications require the attainment of stability, performance, reliability, efficiency, and robustness,
which require tight integration of computing, communication, and control technological systems [2].
CPSs of critical infrastructures have always been the target of criminals and are affected by security
threats [3] because of their complexity and cyber-physical connectivity. These CPSs face security
breaches when people, processes, technology, or other components are being attacked or risk
management systems are missing, inadequate, or fail in any way. The attackers target confidential
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data, such as customer information or other valuable records [4]. It is likely that the threats of CPSs
will only increase in the future as the use of these systems become widespread. However, there are
sensible safety measures that organizations can consider to minimize losses from their destruction.
It is possible to control damages and recover from an attack and its consequences with the appropriate
insight through research and a domain expert’s assistance [5]. Managing CPS security risk is not about
eliminating all risks; it is about determining and understanding the risk rating of events and putting
the right processes or controls in place to manage them in accordance with the organization’s risk
tolerance level. Risk management is a continuous process, not a one-time event [3]. In response to an
event(s), there is an urgent need for organizations to truly understand their cyber-physical security
status and employ the necessary and urgent corrective actions to rectify weaknesses [6].
Risk can be defined as an uncertain event that may occur due to a system malfunction or failure
that could harm assets, such as human beings or the environment, and also influence the organization’s
achievement on strategic, operational, and financial objectives [7]. Risk management is a key discipline
for making effective decisions and communicating the results within organizations. It proactively
identifies potential managerial and technical problems so that appropriate actions can be taken to
reduce or eliminate the probability and/or impact of these problems [8]. There are many existing risk
management methods for CPSs [9–12] However risk management in CPSs is challenging because of
the increased complexity of the systems, the evolution of risk levels, human factor threats comprising
of unintentional breaches of security, the unsuspicious use of infected information media giving away
sensitive information, and lack of awareness and human errors [13]. In addition, cascading failures
occur because of interdependencies among components and infrastructures. Importantly, threats
affecting one part of a CPS can propagate to other parts through the network, which interconnects
different parts of the CPS and affects other parts. As security threats grow, the organization needs a
comprehensive cybersecurity risk management system to identify unique cybersecurity threats and
their trends. The authors of a previous paper [14] discussed the challenges for securing CPS and
analyzed security mechanisms for prevention, detection and recovery, resilience, and deterrence of
attacks for securing CPS. A previous work [15] proposed a layered approach for evaluating risk based
on security to prevent, mitigate, and tolerate attacks both on physical power applications and cyber
infrastructures. The paper identifies the importance of combining both power application security
and supporting infrastructure security into the risk assessment process and provides a methodology
for impact evaluation. Also, another paper Ref. [11] provides an overview of a number of important
real-life issues of cybersecurity and risk assessment for supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) and distributed control systems (DCS). The paper discussed the various compromise graphs
and augmented vulnerability trees that quantitatively determine the probability of an attack, impact
of the attack, and the reduction in risk as a result of a particular countermeasure. All these works,
and more, are presented in the related work section emphasize: the importance of cybersecurity risks
management for CPSs. However, comprehensive and integrated risk management practice is not
sufficiently addressed in these works.
The novel contributions of this paper are: (i) A comprehensive integrated cybersecurity risk
management framework that explicitly considers risk from a holistic perspective of the stakeholder
model, cross functions risks, and existing risk management frameworks; (ii) the integration of the
cascading effect from interdependent CPS components considering vulnerability, threats, and risks
to an asset; and (iii) an evaluation of the proposed integrated risk management approach into a real
cyber physical system. The result from this case study outlines the applicability of the proposed
approach. We also compared the identified results with the existing results to demonstrate the impact
of integrated risk management as approach to the CPS.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines state-of-the-art cyber
security risk management practices for the cyber physical system and existing framework and
standards. Section 3 provides the rationale for the integrated risk management approach. Section 4
presents the proposed cyber security risks management framework including the concepts and
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algorithms. Section 5 demonstrates the evaluation results of the implementation of the proposed
approach into a real smart grid system. This section also discusses of the various parts of the approach
and compares it with other works. Section 6 provides the validity of the study, and finally Section 7
concludes the work and presents a few directions for future work.
2. Related Work
Cybersecurity risk management in CPSs is a very active research area, and a significant number
of research works have been published in this area. We divided these works into three categories:
(1) security risks management methods for CPS; (2) cyber security in smart grid; and (3) security risk
management frameworks/standards/guidelines and presented the summary in the following.
2.1. Security Risks Management for Cyber-Physical System
A Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS) approach was proposed for managing the risks of CPS as
previously described [16]. Countermeasures were proposed on the basis of the risk matrix method
and classified. Risk values were introduced in an information security management system (ISMS)
and quantitative evaluation was conducted for detailed risk assessment. The quantitative evaluation
showed that the proposed countermeasures could reduce risk to some extent. Investigation into the
cost-effectiveness of the proposed countermeasures is an important future work. Cherdantseva et al. [9]
reviewed the state-of-the-art practices in cybersecurity risk assessment of the SCADA systems using
aim, application domain, stages of risk management, risk management concepts, impact measurement,
and sources of probabilistic data, evaluation, and tool support. Despite a large number of risk
assessment methods for SCADA systems, the need for a comprehensive method that would cover
all stages of risk management process is missing. The authors of a previous paper [10] proposed a
new approach for assessing the organization’s vulnerability to information-security breaches using
the threat-impact index and cyber-vulnerability indexes based on vulnerability trees. This helps
managers determine the current level of security and helps them select security mechanisms. However,
probability added to each damage category would help to further quantify the risk associated with
information systems. Hahn et al. [11] provided an overview of smart grid security, including the
set of controls, communication, and physical system components required to provide an accurate
cyber-physical environment. Several attack-impact evaluations were performed on the system such as
availability and integrity attacks. There are other works that [12] focus on detecting computer attacks
which change the behavior of the targeted control systems by understanding the consequences of the
attack for risk assessment. Wu et al. [1] proposed a quantitative risk assessment model that focuses on
the CPS running conditions and calculates risk in real-time using users’ responses to risk at certain
times. It provides users with attack information such as the type of attack, frequency, and target host
ID and source host ID. Ten et al. proposed a cyber-security framework of the SCADA system as a
critical infrastructure using real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, and impact analysis with an
attack tree-based methodology, and mitigation strategies [17].
2.2. Cyber Security in Smart Grid
There are other works that focus on the security of smart grid. For instance Gai et al. [18] proposed
an attack strategy approach using spoofing and jamming in order to interfere with the maximum
number of signal channels. The approach used distributed power usage on both spoofing and
jamming attacks by applying dynamic programming and was evaluated by subsequent experiments.
However, this approach is most applicable to the power grid infrastructure. The authors of a previous
paper Ref. [19] proposed a dynamic energy-aware cloudlet-based mobile cloud computing model
(DECM) that focuses on solving additional energy consumptions during wireless communication in
a power grid environment. The approach contributed to solving energy wastage problems within
a dynamic networking environment, however, the applicability of the model needs to be tested in
multiple industries with other service requirements. A fully homomorphic encryption for blend
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operations (FHE-BO) model was proposed Ref. [20] which focuses on calculating encrypted real
numbers. The encryption-decryption approach successfully acquired correct outputs from decrypting
cypher-results of blend operations. The authors of a previous paper Ref. [19,21] discussed different
unified approaches for security risk management in the context of the smart power grid. Risk
assessment methodologies proposed included threat and vulnerability modeling schemes which
help in identifying and categorizing threats, analyzing their impacts, and prioritizing them. A previous
work Ref. [22] surveys the risk assessment methods, major challenges, and controls for various
aspects of the smart grid such as SCADA systems and communication networks, in order to address
the challenges facing the smart grid technologies. However, smart grids, as a provider, require a
comprehensive cyber security solution by supporting stakeholders and assessing vulnerabilities and
cyber threats and integrating systems to provide guidelines for effective risk management. The authors
of Ref. [23] discussed the risk of cyber-attack on smart metering systems by applying methods and
concepts from cyber-attack scenarios in a smart grid system.
2.3. Frameworks/Standards/Guidelines
There are widely accepted risk management standards such as ISO 31000 that provide guidelines
for risk management activities which also consider risk management as an integral part of the overall
organizational processes, including strategic planning and management processes [24]. IEC 31010 is
also another recognized risk management method and technique [25]. The NIST framework focuses on
managing cyber-security risk and NERC CIP standards for the identification and protection of critical
cyber assets that support the reliable operation of the electric power grid. The NIST framework [26] is
a risk-based approach for managing cyber-security risk. It is applied to deliver a complete platform
that identifies relevant paths, providing guidance that ranges from requirements to implementation.
Critical infrastructure organization can use the NIST framework alongside their existing frameworks
to systematically identify, manage, and assess cybersecurity risk. It can serve as the basis for a
new cybersecurity program or a mechanism for improving its existing programs. The outcome
of the framework will serve as the basis for the on-going operation of the system, which includes
reassessment to verify that the cybersecurity requirements are fulfilled [27]. A particular goal driven
risk management approach [28,29] emphasizes the identification of goals as objectives specific to the
organization mission. Risks are considered as an obstruction to the goal so that identified risks are
assessed based on which goals they oppose. The approach is applied in various domains such as
software development project and cloud computing.
Several observations were made from reviewing the existing works.
 Cherdantseva et al. [9] reviewed existing cyber security risk assessment works and concluded
that it is necessary to have a comprehensive risk management method which will cover all stages
of the risk management process.
 Different risk management approaches for smart grid were also discussed in a previous work [21].
However, risk management from a holistic perspective that incorporates all aspects of a smart
grid and their interdependencies is needed.
 Most of the risk management approaches emphasize assessing vulnerabilities and identifying
threats but lack emphasis on the cascading effect of vulnerabilities and threats to the asset.
 The existing works provide limited efforts in considering the estimation of an accurate risk level
for the organization.
Our work intends to fill these gaps by proposing an integrated cyber-security risk management
approach. The novelty of this work is a comprehensive cyber-security risk management framework
that considers all phases of the risk management process. We follow the existing risk management
standard and framework with a holistic view of the risks and propose our approach. In particular,
the proposed work is initiated by understanding of the business context and current risk management
status of the organization. The approach considers cascading vulnerabilities and threats to generate
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a cyber-attack scenario and the impact of the risks are considered from the CPS organization’s key
performance indicators (KPIs) to generate the accurate risk levels.
3. The Rationale for an Integrated Risk Management Approach
An integrated risk management includes a combination of various components of a CPS which are
interdependent and necessary for successful risk management. It needs to be a part of an organization’s
strategy in order to address the organization’s risk management principles. Critical infrastructure
organizations (i.e., health, financial, telecommunications, transportation, energy, and water) are
always the targets for attackers and face different types of risks [30]. An integrated risk management
scheme enforces a constant assessment of potential risks at every level in an organization and gathers
the results at the corporate level to enable priority setting and minimize risk. The identification,
assessment, and management of risks throughout the organization help to avoid greater risks and
foster improvement of the organization. Traditional security risk assessment methods only address
IT security risk or compliance risk. The integrated risk management framework will build a holistic
solution considering the technical and nontechnical aspects of the organization. Figure 1 shows several
areas that will incorporate into an integrated risk management approach. The main components of the
integrated risk management framework are:
 Integration of stakeholder’s model: The integration of the stakeholder’s model for risk
management is a means of achieving greater inclusivity in an organization, and it is important
for an organization to understand its own security risk management practices. This approach
shows the importance of security from each and every area of the business enterprise of a critical
infrastructure organization by making it clear to managers and subsequently enhancing employee
commitment. In a traditional security risk assessment having just one stakeholder, which could
be the compliance manager or security director, the value of the security risk assessment process
is limited. An integrated risk management approach seeks to relate vulnerability findings and
IT control gaps in the context of how such findings may affect attackers, users, government,
shareholders, regulatory authorities, numerous individuals, or groups across an organization.
It also deals with the human issues for risk management.
 Measurement of cross-functional risks from organizational context: An effective risk management
method renders a successful management of various factors that prevent organizations from
achieving their desired security objectives. Risks depicted through an integrated risk management
approach become cross-functional (i.e., a system whereby people from different areas of an
organization work together as a team considering both technical and nontechnical perspectives),
and the approach draws an obvious conclusion on how risks affect regulatory requirements,
the supply management chain, and the goals or KPSs of the organization and its security objectives.
The approach will provide a better understanding of cross-functional risks amongst control
objectives that may have been impacted by technical or process-based vulnerabilities and will give
attention to any higher risks. Cross-functional risks include technical risks and nontechnical risks
such as software risk, system complexity and vulnerabilities, environmental risk, legal security,
etc. As the approach captures different information from different stakeholders, security issues
are shared across the organization and weighed appropriately in light of the management’s level
of criticality for each business and control function.
 Builds upon existing frameworks/standards/guidelines: An integrated risk management
approach builds upon existing frameworks by evaluating how the combination of neglected
risk factors could yield minor to terrible outcomes. A state-of-the-art and well-known approach
can smoothly lead an organization beyond simple compliance and reveal how to more effectively
secure a particular information environment. The approach understands regulatory requirements
and can translate them into control objectives for the organization. The existing frameworks
and standards that will be considered for the risk management process will include, the NIST
framework, ISO 31000:2009, ISO 27001:2013, and goal-driven risk management framework which
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will provide guidelines for risk management activities and also considers risk management as an
important aspect of the overall organizational process [24,25,28,29].
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4. An Integrated Risk Management Approach
The scope of the proposed integrated risk ma agement approach is to understand, manage,
monitor and c mmuni ation of risks during operation in CPS for the be efit of a critical nfras ructure
organization. It includes man concepts that serve as a common language for describing the properties
necessary for cybersecurity risk management. These concepts help us to systematically assess and
manage risks proactively. In particular, we consider assets and their criticalities, relevant vulnerabilities
and threats to model the cybersecurity attack scenario so that risk level can be quantified for the suitable
countermeasure. This section presents an overview of the integrated risk management concepts of the
proposed approach.
4.1. Modeling Concepts
The proposed approach includes a set of odeling concepts that ar essential to understand,
manage, and express cybersecurity risks. We have identified a f w concepts necessary for the
development of the cybersecurity risk management approach. Based on those concepts, an in- epth
exploration of the numerous methods, tools, and techniques that can be used for a risk management
approach in the CPS has been perform d. An overview of the concepts used by the prop s d approach
is explained below:
 Actor: An actor is an entity, generally a human user, a system, an organization, or a process each
with a specific strategic goal within its organizational setting and carries out specific activities
to gener t cyb security risk management actions or receive the gen rated cybersecurity risk
management actions by another acto [31]. This r quires the organization to appoint efficient
actors to carry out various tasks to guide and lead in achieving its goals. The actors are identified
as stakeholders, such as government employees, IT providers, and utilities, employees, consumers,
owners and operators, customers, users, and providers with skills within a particular location.
 Goals: Goals signify the overall aims and objectives of an actor which supports the interest and
continuity of the business. There are expectations to support the organization and include the
KPIs of the organization, security, and organizational goals. KPIs allow the critical infrastructure
organization actors to make a keen deci ion about t e organization’s continuity; they include
confide tiality, availability, and integrity.
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 Risks: Risk can be defined as the possibility of an unwanted outcome as a result of an incident,
event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. The risk
is inevitable in a business, however, it is the role of the actors to ensure that risks are kept to a
minimum to achieve the goals. Once the risk has been identified, it is necessary to have a mitigation
plan or any other solution to counterattack the risk. Risks are the potential consequences of
the system and could possibly compromise the security of the CPS and not meet the actor’s
expectations. A CPS risk could be classified under security, operational, nontechnical, technical,
and governance or regulatory parameters. These risks could obstruct the security of the CPS
and require an appropriate assessment. The risk assessment will be based on likelihood, impact,
and residual analysis, which helps in identifying which risk needs to be controlled by following
different control strategies.
 Assets. Assets are defined as tangible or intangible entities which are necessary and have values
to the CPS organization. Identification of key assets, and putting a value on each key asset, is
an important process of risk management. These key assets could be people, services, facilities,
processes, etc. It is important to identify critical assets as well as estimate their critical failure
modes or impact of the loss. An asset has two features: (i) criticality and (ii) category. Criticality
is defined as a measure of the consequences associated with the degradation or loss of an asset.
It is the major indicator used by organizations to determine which asset is of more value to the
business continuity. Category classifies assets according to its level of sensitivity and security
requirements. The criticality of an asset category can be high, medium, or low, which means that
assets with high rating are the most valuable to the organization.
 Controls. The set of security protections or countermeasures to avoid or minimize security
risks in CPS critical infrastructure are called controls. Controls are also the mechanism used to
provide security to the CPS, and they are characterized by combining technical and nontechnical
controls which are used to deter anticipated and unanticipated threats from exploiting known
vulnerabilities. They also describe the vital components and actions taken to protect the assets.
The overall goal of risk assessment will be partly defeated if relevant controls are not applied.
 Compliance Programs: These are sets of requirements designed to secure the CPS to operate
without any form of disturbance. Critical infrastructures are increasingly using compliance
programs as a mechanism for demonstrating cybersecurity for CPS protection. The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC CIP) is a
compliance program designed to secure the assets necessary for operating a bulk electric system.
In this case, the SCADA system of the CPS is an asset. Therefore, a significant sum of their budget
and time is necessary to ensure security compliance with standards such as NERC CIP, NIST,
NIPP, and other relevant standards.
 Cyber-attack scenario: A cyber-attack scenario is an event that leads to a negative impact on
the organization’s assets when it occurs. There are some certain components that determine a
cyber-attack on a CPS. They include threat types, actor’s skill, capability and location, assets,
events, and time. With certain scenarios, the organization tends to think broadly by developing a
range of possible outcomes to increase their readiness for a range of possibilities in the future.
 Policy: Policies are the principles of action adopted or proposed by an organization. There are a
number of security policies, such as access control and backup that are necessary to formulate
and implement the CPS security program.
 Threats and vulnerabilities: Vulnerability is the weakness in an organization security program
that is exploited by a threat to gain unauthorized access to an asset. It has three properties. i.e.,
impact, type, and weight score.
The Metamodel illustrated in Figure 2 above shows the relationship between the concepts.
The actor is represented as having an interest in SCADA system services offered by the CPS. The actor
introduces security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and organizational goals
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such as business continuity and reputation of the organization and the key performance indicators
such as authenticity, consistency, resilience, etc., and the attainment of one or more is always their
focus. As concerns are raised in regards to risk which may impede the fulfilment of the goals, controls
regarding security and the organization are introduced to help mitigate the risks. The actor has full
control over its assets and needs to keep the assets secure for the continuity of the business, but these
assets are prone to weaknesses in their systems, known as vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities,
when not addressed on time, can lead to a threat which will introduce risk, and this risk is likely to
lead to the exploitation of the assets. Once the risk factors have been identified, risk assessment is
carried out to mitigate them.
Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW  8 of 28 
the exploitation f the assets. Once he risk factors have been identifi d, risk ass ssment i  carried out 
to mitigate he . 
Assets
- Criticality
Threats & 
Vulnerabilities
Risks 
Actor
- Motivation 
Goals
-Organisational
introduce
Controls 
- Organisation
impede
control 
needs
exploit 
influenced by
introduce
Attack scenario
generate
assesses
- Skill
- Location
User Attacker
- Type
- Security objectives
- Impact
- Type
- Impact
- Weight score
- Likelihood
- Impact
link
-Security 
-KPI
- Security
Policy
imposed to
Compliance 
program 
Types
mitigate
 
Figure 2. Metamodel. 
4.2. Risk Management Process 
The process of risk management comprises a systematic collection of activities. We follow the 
guidelines identified in the existing risk management standards ISO 310000 [32], NIST SP800-30 
framework [26], and NERC CIP standards [33] to define our risk management process. The process 
consists of six different sequential activities which are linked with each other and every activity 
includes steps to support specific tasks relating to risk management. 
4.2.1. Activity 1: Risk Management Context 
The risk management context formally triggers the risk management activities. The purpose of 
this activity is to define the system and its components, scope, the KPI, and the risk acceptance level 
in which an organization will tolerate the residual risk to the overall business continuity. Active 
involvement of the actor’s requirement is taken into account, risk managers and management 
representatives are also considered for successfully planning of risk management activities that focus 
on the cybersecurity of the CPS. The initiation of risk management is determined by the 
implementation of the risk management scope, schedule, available resources, risk monitoring 
strategy, and risk treatment, based on the critical infrastructure organizations’ objectives. It includes 
three steps which are given below. 
Step 1: Identify the system and components and existing risk management practice 
This step identifies the system and its associated components of a critical infrastructure. This 
step also identifies the current risk management practice for the CPS organization. We follow the 
NIST cyber security framework’s implementation tiers for this purpose framework [28]. In particular, 
according to the framework, tiers range from 1 (partial) to 4 (adaptive). This allows us to understand 
Figure 2. Metamodel.
4.2. Risk Management Process
The process of risk management comprises a systematic collection of activities. We follow the
guidelines identified in the existing risk management standards ISO 310000 [32], NIST SP800-30
framework [26], and NERC CIP standards [33] to define our risk management process. The process
consists of six different sequential activities which are linked with each other and every activity
includes steps to support specific tasks relating to risk management.
4.2.1. ctivity 1: isk anage ent ontext
The risk anage ent context for ally triggers the risk anage ent activities. The purpose of
this activity is to define the system and its components, scope, the KPI, and the risk acceptance
level in which an organization will tolerate the residual risk to the overall business continuity.
Active involvement of the actor’s requirement is taken into account, risk managers and anage ent
representatives are also considered for successfully planning of risk management activities that focus on
the cybersecurity of the CPS. The initiation of risk management is deter ined by the i plementation
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of the risk management scope, schedule, available resources, risk monitoring strategy, and risk
treatment, based on the critical infrastructure organizations’ objectives. It includes three steps which
are given below.
Step 1: Identify the system and components and existing risk management practice
This step identifies the system and its associated components of a critical infrastructure. This step
also identifies the current risk management practice for the CPS organization. We follow the NIST
cyber security framework’s implementation tiers for this purpose framework [28]. In particular,
according to the framework, tiers range from 1 (partial) to 4 (adaptive). This allows us to understand
the organization’s current risk management practice and desired practice for future practice. Critical
infrastructure is a unique system because of its complex, diversified, mutual interrelations among its
systems, components, and other systems [34]. Due to the relationship between other components and
systems, the state of one system is highly dependent on the state of the other system or component and
thus these factors are called interdependencies. Interdependencies among the systems or components
can be classified into four categories, as explained below.
 Physical interdependency: This refers to two or more infrastructures that are physically
interdependent if the operation of one infrastructure depends on the physical output of the other.
 Cyber interdependency: Refers to the state of an infrastructure depending on the information
communicated through the information infrastructure.
 Logical interdependencies: This type of interdependency occurs when the state of each
infrastructure depends on the state of the other through controls, mechanisms, regulatory or
otherwise, that cannot be considered cyber, physical, or geographical.
 Geographical independencies: This kind of interdependency occurs when elements of multiple
infrastructures are in the same remote area. In this case, natural disasters can cause an element of
one infrastructure to create failure in one or more infrastructures within close vicinity.
Step 2: Determine goals and key performance indicators (KPI)
This step identifies the organizational and security goals. The main goals are general
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and reputation. Based on these goals, the key performance
indicators for the organizational context are considered, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the
organization, which help to explain the need for cybersecurity risk management. It is also necessary
to identify the key operational responsibilities of the critical infrastructure in order to support the
cybersecurity activities. Key performance indicators play an integral role in risk management. They are
the benefits and targets set by organizations and these goals must be achieved. A secure CPS should
be able to provide the below KPI:
 Confidentiality (C): This KPI deals with the disclosure of sensitive data against unauthorized
users, CPS internal users, external users, and malicious attackers. It involves the deletion and
transfer of data between authorized users in a secure environment to prevent data leakage.
 High availability (A): Availability refers to ensuring that the assets of the critical infrastructure
are made available and accessible to the end users as agreed, or when and where they need it.
It defines the degree or extent to which the asset is readily usable along with the necessary IT and
management procedures, tools, and technologies required to enable, manage, and continue to
make it available.
 Integrity (I): Integrity refers to the ability of critical infrastructure organizations assets to perform
their required functions effectively and efficiently without any disruption or loss of service.
It includes the critical aspect of any asset which stores, processes, and retrieves data, its design,
implementation, and usage. Integrity ensures that the data managed by systems and messages
communicated over the network altered by unauthorized users.
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 Resiliency (R): This KPI allows for the CPS to be able to work on an acceptable level of efficiency
even when external or internal disturbances occur.
 Reputation (RE): Reputation is the trust and confidence the organization has gained by the public
or given to the public.
 Authenticity (AUT): This KPI improves the identification and verification technology of an
authorized user in order to provide security, ease of use, and administration. It has the capacity to
identify an authorized user to its specific appropriate information and service type.
 Nonrepudiation (NR): This KPI provides certifiable evidence of a message being delivered to both
communication endpoints in order to ensure that either the sender or the receiver does not deny
sending and/or receiving the message.
 Maintainability (M): Maintainability is associated with the mean time to repair (MTTR) an asset
and get it to work perfectly within a specified period of time. The time could be categorized as
less than a day, several days, one week, several weeks, month(s), or even a year.
Step 3: Risk acceptance level
The risk acceptance level gives an organization a guideline with which risk needs to be controlled
based on management decision linking with residual risks. With a proper risk management process,
risk can be eliminated, but not to a zero level, therefore, the remaining risk is referred to as the residual
risk and should be accepted to a certain level with reference to Table 1 below. Accepting risk to a certain
level is really important for a critical infrastructure and organization and its surrounding context.
There are no risk-free systems; therefore, the need to understand which level of acceptance of risk
after control is important for an organization. A well secured CPS can resist any form of disturbances
either internally or externally and is able to continue working on an acceptable efficiency level [34].
Based on the probability of occurrence and impact, the risk level will be categorized into five different
risk levels. Therefore, the risk management approach decides what level of risk can be accepted for
the organization.
Table 1. Asset weight score.
Category Range
Extreme 0.81–1.00
High 0.61–0.80
Medium 0.41–0.60
Low 0.21–0.40
Very Low 0.0–0.20
4.2.2. Activity 2: Assets Identification and Criticality
This activity identifies the assets of the critical infrastructure organization which require more
attention. For a successful risk management process, asset identification is critical due to the threats
that impact on the assets. The activity identifies the assets and determines their criticality so that
critical assets obtain adequate protection. We aware that threats are becoming more forward-thinking
and attacks are targeted against CPS, with vulnerabilities are being exploited and attempts being made
to destroy CPSs [35]. Therefore, the identification and protection of critical assets is necessary to avoid
cyber-attacks on them and their subsequent destruction.
Step 1: Criticality identification
Criticality is a major indicator that determines the important assets of the CPS. This task combines
the weight of an asset with the impact value of the asset to get the critical level of the asset. There is
no standard way of combining information to determine which asset is relatively more important
than others. The protection of all critical assets is almost impossible due to resource limitations and
budgetary constraints. Thus, the effective identification of the most critical assets allows for ranking,
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and an investment is made on those assets if the disruption could have a serious impact on national
security, public health, safety, or business continuity. Asset criticality is determined based on the
weight score and the impact value score. However, if a selected asset is considered more important,
the weighting factor should be greater, but if the asset is considered less important, then it should be
less. The asset critical level will be considered based in the description of following three categories:
Noncritical, Reasonably Critical, and Extremely Critical. The categories are defined below.
 Noncritical level 0.01–3.99.
 A reasonably critical level 4.00–7.99.
 An extremely critical level 8.00–10.00.
Step 2: Asset weight
The asset weighting score is determined according to the level in which an asset is important to the
continuity of the CPS objective. The category does not fully define criticality; however, the criticality
of an asset can be categorized into high, medium, or low depending on the asset weight assigned.
Assets with high rating are considered more valuable to the continuity of CPS, those with a medium
rating represent moderate value, and those with a low rating mean that the asset is of minor value to
the CPS continuity. A weight score will be assigned to each asset based on the subjective judgment
given by the organization’s stakeholders. Weight scoring allows the allocating of scores to achieve
a total score indicating the assets criticality as shown in Table 1 below; Equation (1) determines the
asset criticality.
Asset criticality (AC) = Asset weight score  Impact value score
AC =
n10
å
i=1
(WiVi) (1)
Using a Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) method, asset criticality level can be determined for
each asset. Where a summation of the:
 IV = Impact value will range from 1.00–10.0.
 W = Weight score will range from 0.01–1.00.
4.2.3. Activity 3: Vulnerability Assessment and Threat Identification
This activity identifies and assesses the vulnerabilities that could exploit and impact on the assets
identified by the previous activity. Vulnerability assessment follows different techniques, in our case,
we will follow a checklist of all possible vulnerabilities associated with each critical asset, how many
different assets are affected by one or many vulnerabilities, and finally how vulnerability cascade
to affecting another vulnerability, therefore, causing the occurrence of a threat. The vulnerability is
an exposure to security that results in the weakness of a critical asset allowing for the compromise
of any of the security objectives [36], and is defined as ‘the measure of the susceptibility of a system
to threat’ [37]. Identification and assessing vulnerability is an important and a delicate task that has
an impact on the successful operation of assets that provide CPS services. There are several ways in
which an attacker can exploit CPS vulnerability and therefore causing severe damage, starting from an
attacker only being able to view information and ending with a worst-case scenario. Regardless of any
vulnerability discovered, the attacker has little or complete control over the system and any action
taken is referred to as a cyber-attack. Summary of a checklist table of the possible vulnerabilities found
in the critical assets of a CPS will be given in the evaluation section. The list does not capture all the
vulnerabilities because it changes over time, which could be due to environmental or technical changes.
The check-list of vulnerabilities [31] will be used for illustration and will be categorized into software,
hardware, database, application, communication, and network of the of CPS. This activity will be
divided into two steps, the first step will look at the vulnerability rating based on the impact of the
vulnerability on critical assets, and the second step will assess the vulnerability impact on the assets.
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Step 1: Vulnerability Impact Rating
The impact of vulnerability on critical assets will be assigned a vulnerability rating score of VR.1
to VR.5 from very high to very low for the vulnerability found on each critical asset. In the case of
multiple vulnerabilities, vulnerability is assessed and a score is given. Description of the various levels
of VR (Vulnerability Rating) will be explained in Table 2 below:
Table 2. Vulnerability rating table.
Score (VR) Criteria Description
VR.5 Very high
One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset
extremely susceptible to an attack. The organization has no capability
of resisting the occurrence of a threat.
VR.4 High
One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset
highly susceptible to an attack. The organization has the low capability
of resisting the occurrence of a threat.
VR.3 Medium
A weakness has been identified that makes the asset moderately
susceptible to an attack. The organization has the reasonable capability
of resisting the occurrence of a threat.
VR.2 Low
A minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases the
susceptibility of the asset to an attack. The organization has a good
capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat.
VR.1 Very low No weaknesses exist. The organization has an excellent capability ofresisting the occurrence of a threat.
Step 2: Asset Vulnerability Impact Assessment Model (A-VIAM)
We propose an Asset Vulnerability Impact Assessment Model (A-VIAM) to determine the
vulnerability impact on an asset. The model is built upon mathematical multi-value theory and
structured as a value model [38]. A-VIAM is an additive preference model that assigns a value on
a scale of 0.01–10.0 for vulnerability impact. The Vulnerability Rating (VR) on a scale of 1–5 is used
to assess the vulnerability of a critical asset component and will be divided by the total number of a
vulnerability discovered. The total impact value of all the critical asset components will be summed
together and divided by the total number of the critical assets considered to assess the vulnerability
of the entire system. The different vulnerabilities identified for a software asset, for example, the VR
score will be assigned based on its impact on the software critical asset. All the VR values will be
summed together to get an impact value for the Software asset and divided by the total number of
vulnerabilities identified. The same method is applied to every other critical asset. The calculation for
the A-VIAM model is shown below;
VI(CA) =
n
å
VR=1
VVR1 +VVR2 . . . + nvrn
total number o f vulnerability
(2)
where: VI = Vulnerability Impact. Scores range between 1.00 and 10.0, and will be assigned to
a vulnerability impact on to the critical asset. Where 1.00–3.99 = low, 4.00–6.99 = medium and
7.00–10.0 = high. VR = Vulnerability Rating. A score of 1–5 is given for the VR as shown in Table 2.
V = Vulnerability type, this will be the various vulnerability types associated with each critical asset as
shown in Table 7. CA = Critical Asset.
For example, if three vulnerabilities (V3.1, V3.2, and V3.4) from the checklist above were identified
as a Software asset, the vulnerabilities will be rated using the VR score to get the vulnerability impact
on the software asset using Equation (3):
VI(CA) = V3.14 + V3.23 + V3.44 = 11/3 = 3.67
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In this case, the vulnerability impact of the software asset is low, therefore there is little possibility
of a threat occurring. The more the vulnerability is identified as an asset, the higher the vulnerability
impact on the asset. To calculate vulnerability impact of an entire system, the total Vulnerability Impact
of each CA, VI(CA) will be summed together and divided by the total number of assets identified using
the equation below:
VI(S)
n
å
VA (CA)=1
VI (CA1) +VI(CA2) . . . +VI(CAn)
total number o f assets
(3)
where S = Overall Critical Infrastructure System.
The category of the overall vulnerability system will have a range between 10 and 100%
indicating vulnerability.
Step 3: Identify threats
The final step of this activity identifies the threat caused by the existence of a vulnerability
which affects the critical assets of a critical infrastructure and its ability to deliver its services. Critical
Infrastructures can be remotely controlled over the internet by the implementation of IT systems [39].
This implementation of IT systems on critical infrastructures and the interconnection between the two
has given room for cyber threats leading to security concerns. Vulnerabilities such as the denial of
service or malware attacks, which are famous in Critical Infrastructures, can lead to threats thereby,
causing security challenges to the interconnected devices [40]. This task will also look at the different
threats that affect critical assets, consequently, creating the occurrence of a risk or risks.
4.2.4. Activity 4: Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a challenging task for the overall risk management process due to difficulties
in quantifying the risk, specifically in CPS domain. We advocate to identify and evaluate the critical
assets and vulnerabilities of the assets so that it eases the risk assessment activity. The first step of this
activity generated the cybersecurity attack scenario based on the asset and threat from the previous
activity, followed by other steps which are given below.
Step 1: Generate cyber-security attack scenario
This step generates the cyber-security attack scenario based on the identified assets, threats,
and potential vulnerabilities. The cyber-security attack scenario is a combination of threats,
vulnerabilities, and assets. Typically those vulnerabilities and threats that have cascade-linked with
each other are included in order to generate an attack scenario. Every attack scenario will have an
impact to oppose the organizational goals of the critical infrastructure. Therefore, the cybersecurity
attack scenario has interdependency between the vulnerabilities and threat to exploit risk. Due to the
interdependency between components of a critical infrastructure organization, cascading effects are
likely to occur. Vulnerabilities cascade through each other to trigger threat which eventually turns into
a risk. In terms of the cascading effect, it could be a logical, cyber, physical, or geographical cascade
subject, depending on its type of interdependency. The concept of the cyber-security attack scenario is
used in the approach to clearly define the type of activities that occur during risk assessment.
Step 2: Determine the likelihood of a cyber-security attack scenario
This step determines the likelihood of the risk event of the attack scenario generated in step 1.
To generate the likelihood of the attack scenario, we consider the access point, attacker’s location and
capability, entry and target point, numbers of vulnerabilities exploited by the attacker and the skill of
the attacker. This assessment will be performed by estimating two quantities, which are the likelihood
of the potential scenario S occurring multiplied by the vulnerability impact as a result of the number
of vulnerabilities identified which is estimated using historical evidence, empirical data and other
factors. The risk R is calculated by multiplying the likelihood of the cyber security attack scenario and
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its impact as shown in Equation (4), where i refers to the number of each type of incident that could
result in scenario S occurring and affecting the system. The Table 3 below shows three different levels
that will determine the likelihood of the attack scenario occurring and the Ri likelihood.
Ri = L(Si)  VI (4)
where,
 L(S) = the likelihood of the occurrence of the scenario S.
 i = 1, 2, 3 . . . n. The number of each incident that could result in a scenario occurring.
 Ri = risk; S = a scenario; L = likelihood; VI = vulnerability impact.
Table 3. The likelihood scale.
Levels L(S) Ri
Almost certain 0.60–1.00 1.00–1.99
Likely 0.59–0.30 2.00–3.99
Unlikely 0.29–0.01 4.00–5.00
Step 3: Attackers’ skill and location
The location and skill of the attacker are based on their knowledge and expertise in organizing,
executing, and succeeding in an attack. The attacker’s characteristics, capability, and possible location
will be explained below. The attacker’s location could be internal, end-to-end, external, or physical.
An internal attacker’s location is usually found within the network of the organization. We consider
three different levels of attacker skill which are given below and a general procedure to determine
the likelihood
 Level 1: At this level the attacker has insufficient knowledge, skill, and/or resources to perform
a successful attack. This attacker is most likely to be found in any of the three locations
mentioned above.
 Level 2: At this level, the attacker has moderate skill level and resources to exploit one known
vulnerability successfully, and the attacker is most likely to be found in the three locations
mentioned above.
 Level 3: In this level, the attacker is an expert with sufficient level of skills and resources to exploit
at least one known vulnerability successfully and the attacker is most likely to be found within
the network as an internal attacker, end-to-end, an external attacker, or a physical attacker.
Likelihood identification procedure
L(Si) = likelihood of the scenario
Ri = risk
VI = vulnerability impact of vulnerability Vi
AL = attacker level
For each identified vulnerability Vi
Determine vulnerability impact VI
Measure the likelihood of the scenario L(Si)
For each Ri,
Calculate Ri = L(Si) * VI
If (Ri  1.99) AND AL =1 then
L(S) is unlikely to occur
If (Ri  3.99) AND AL = 2 or 3 then
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L(S) is likely to occur
If (Ri  5.00) AND AL = 2 or 3 then
L(S) is almost certain to occur.
Step 4: Determine the impact of the cyber-security attack scenario
The impact I of a cyber-security attack scenario S is determined based on the likelihood L of the
scenario S occurring and its impact on the organizations KPI K. For example, in a power grid system,
if a cyber-security attack scenario should occur, there is a higher likelihood that its impact will be on
the critical infrastructure organizations KPI (availability). Risk impact will depend on the affected KPI.
If risk affects KPI impact will certainly be high. The relative importance of the KPI depends on its level
of risk impact on the business. If there is a risk on the KPI of the system that has a high impact on the
business, the risk impact will be high. Therefore, KPI, measured based on a subjective judgment of the
actors, is needed to provide previous records of risk events that must have occurred and the impact of
the cyber-security attack scenario. KPI importance level will follow a weight score scale of 0.01–1.00;
extreme (1.00–0.81), high (0.80–0.61), medium (0.60–0.41), low (0.40–0.21) and very low (0.20–0.01)
to identify the relative weight of each KPI. The impact of overall risk scale will be; low (0.01–3.99),
medium (4.00–7.99), high (8.00–10.0).
I =
n10
å
w=1
(LS + Kw1 . . .Kwn) (5)
where KPI (K): Key Performance Indicator; W: Weight score; L: Likelihood; I: Impact; S: Scenario; Kn:
number of KPIs; Kw: weight of KPI; C = confidentiality, A = availability, I = integrity, R = resilience,
AUT = authenticity, REP = reputation, NR = Nonrepudiation, M = maintainability.
In order to determine the impact of a cyber-security attack scenario, several preassumptions have
been made for this purpose:
Preassumption 1. Attacker is an expert and familiar with one of the vulnerabilities and exploits it for the attack.
Preassumption 2. Attacker is an expert and familiar with all possible vulnerabilities and exploits them all for
the attack.
Preassumption 3. The attacker is an expert and familiar with all possible vulnerabilities and exploits one for
the attack.
Preassumption 4. Attacker is an intermediate and familiar with possible vulnerability and exploits all for
the attack.
Preassumption 5. The attacker is a novice and familiar with only one of the vulnerabilities and therefore
exploits just that one for the attack.
Preassumption 6. The attacker is a novice and familiar with none of the vulnerabilities and therefore exploits
nothing for the attack.
Step 5: Identify the risk level
This final step identifies the risk level for each cyber-security attack scenario generated,
the likelihood of the scenario occurring and the impact of the Scenario on KPI when it occurs. Risk
level value is the addition of the likelihood of the cyber-security attack scenario resulting in a risk event
and the impact of the risk event on the KPI of the organization using the Equation (6). We consider
various risk level as shown in Table 4.
RL = L (S) + I (6)
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Table 4. Risk level description.
Risk Level Score Description
Extreme 10.0–8.00
The risk level is extremely critical and requires the implementation of the control
measures to mitigate risk almost immediately. The risk level is extremely critical when
both the likelihood and the impact of the risk event is extreme. Could result in serious
damage that could obstruct the operations of the organization.
High 7.99–6.00
The risk level is highly critical and requires the implementation of the control
measures for mitigating risk that has to be immediately within a short time frame.
The risk impact is highly critical when both the likelihood and impact of the risk event
are extreme and/or high. Expected to have a serious impact on the organization’s
reputation.
Medium 5.99–4.00
The risk level implies that the risk has an adversarial effect on the organization and
effective actions need to be applied to the contingency plan of the organization and
within a specific period of time. It is likely to result in a short-term disruption of the
organization’s services.
Low 3.99–2.00 The risk level from the risk event requires the organization to take effective actions andmay require the need for a new contingency plan as well as corrective measures.
Very low 1.99–1.00 This risk level indicates that a corrective measure needs to be implemented and acontingency plan needs to be developed.
4.2.5. Activity 5: Risk Control
This activity identifies the possible control measures that could mitigate and eliminate identified
risk related to the critical assets. No system is risk-free, therefore, in order to reduce security breaches
to protect assets from the various types of threats and vulnerabilities, effective controls must be applied.
In some cases, weaknesses in the controls make it impossible to protect the assets completely. Therefore,
risk assessment is a crucial step for the management of risk in Critical Infrastructures. We follow five
main risks control strategy as shown below:
 Avoidance: Risk avoidance involves eliminating risks that can negatively affect an organizations
asset. Risk avoidance looks for ways to avoid compromising events completely by taking measure
to ensure that threats do not occur. However, it is almost impossible to avoid all risks completely.
 Reduction: Risk reduction involves the lessening of vulnerabilities and threats events that affect
the continuity of a critical process by creating contingency plans to enable critical infrastructure
organizations to continue operating under recovery management. With risk reduction, the impact
of a risk is limited so that it does not occur, and if it does occur, the problem will be easier to repair.
The reduction can be against the impact and likelihood of the event occurring and implementing
controls to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
 Prevention: This measure should deter or avoid the risk event that can cause a negative impact
on the critical infrastructure organization. Realistic preventive actions such as business continuity
are put in place for effective risk control during cybersecurity risk management.
 Acceptance: This control strategy mainly involves taking no action by accepting the present
level of the evaluated risk. Risk acceptance is a good strategy when the impact of the risk to the
organization is very small.
 Transfer: The risk transfer measure basically shifts risks to other contract partners or enterprises,
mainly to reduce the financial impact on the critical infrastructure organization or the
responsibility of implementing the mitigating controls.
4.2.6. Activity 6: Risk Monitor and Residual Risk
This activity monitors the existing risk and identifies new risks which could emerge from the CPS.
We consider residual risk as a remaining risk after putting any control to determine the effectiveness of
the control. Residual risks procedure: Residual risk is the risk left untreated after a risk assessment
has been carried out and the risk has been identified and controls implemented. After the risk has
been identified, we mitigate the unacceptable risk, the remaining risk is called the residual risk,
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and therefore, the risk assessment will have to be initiated from the start considering the influence of
the controls to reduce the likelihood and impact of an incident. Residual risks are tightly connected
to the acceptable level of risk, if the risk level is below acceptable risk, then nothing is done, and the
management accepts those risk. If the risk level is above the acceptable level of risk, then new ways to
mitigate those risk must be implemented.
5. Evaluation
We follow an empirical investigation through a case study and action research to determine the
usefulness of the integrated risk management approach. We follow an empirical investigation through
a case study and action research to determine the usefulness of the integrated risk management
approach. For any empirical investigation, it is necessary to confirm the various factors, such as
availability of resources, appropriate investigation questions relating to the method and study context,
participant knowledge towards the study area, and many more. In our case, we confirmed all these
factors and action research for this context contributes to the understanding of the risks and provides
solutions to mitigate the risks. We investigated the study context and compared the study results with
other studies to generalize our findings and validity of the research results.
5.1. Study Goal
The goal of the study is to:
 understand the risks associated with a CPS.
 identify suitable control management methods for the risks in a proactive manner.
 achieve feasibility of the integrated risk management method for CPS.
5.2. Data Collection and Analysis
The data collection process started with understanding the system context and interviewing
the selected staff. We also reviewed various organizational documents in order to understand the
existing policies and practices relating to risk management and information security. Note that,
we provided an overview of the integrated risk management approach before starting any data
collection. The collected data were analyzed by following both qualitatively and quantitatively
methods. In particular, the unit of analysis considered the existing risk management process, no of
identified risks and effectiveness of risk control. Finally we have taken the participants” view relating
to the integrated risk management approach.
5.3. Study Context
The Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), formerly the National Electric Power Authority
(NEPA), is an organization that generates, distributes, and transmits electricity in Nigeria. DIStribution
COmpany (Disco) has acquired a license to distribute electricity and currently has 11 branches across
Nigeria that serves at least 30,000 customers within an area. The main business process of Disco is
to provide last-mile services in the electricity supply value chain, transforming or stepping down
electricity from high voltage at the transmission level to lower voltage depending on the category of
the customer, and is responsible for the marketing and sale of electricity to customers, providing tax to
the government, collecting bills, and collection and customer care functions its geographical area.
The whole underlined infrastructure of Disco is a cyber-physical system. It consists of a
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system which monitors processes that take place
within the facility, as well as the storage and distribution components of the system to the surrounding
area. Other components include communication and networks, distribution systems, server systems,
control layers, field devices, smart devices, users, and operators of SCADA systems. The specific
functions of the SCADA system include historical data logging for analysis and trending, alarming,
controls, and process visualization. Disco also provide laptops for employees for emails, analysis,
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and scheduling while at work or at home, remote access and project planning. There are Local Area
Networks (LANs) within Disco for conducting business operations (i.e., file sharing, emails, databases,
and web portals), operating the SCADA system. It consists of components such as the workstation,
alarm management, and data control (gateways). Finally, the secondary LAN is used for stimulation,
testing, and development. The existing systems (computers and servers) and the SCADA use a
Windows-based operating system.
Recently, several incidents happened at Disco. All branches of Disco deployed a new SCADA
system in order to improve power reliability, cyber security, and resilience to disruption. These use
a SCADA consisting of 5 generic machine types connected to a local Ethernet LAN to support their
services. There was a vulnerability found in the RTU (remote terminal unit) of the SCADA system
in one of the branches. The RTU that controls the physical state of the equipment in the field lacked
firewall up-gradation that caused data loss and operational disruption. For that reason, the other
branches have decided to perform a risk management to assess vulnerabilities, such as the lack of
firewalls, lack of identification and authentication mechanism, unprotected communication lines,
single point of failure, flooding of local network from external sources, and to also identify other
vulnerabilities that might affect its assets in the present or future. So our work focuses on assisting
the mitigation of the risks and improving the cybersecurity practice. The first author of the paper
and two members of Discos, including the head of IT, investigated the situation as part of a common
research interest.
5.4. Introduction to the Integrated Risk Management Process
5.4.1. Activity 1: Risk Management Context
The risk management context identified the system components and determined its goals and KPI
for the Disco Company. The systems include SCADA systems, communications and networks, SCADA
users and operators, smart devices, software’s, server systems, database, operating systems, and field
devices. These systems are physical, geographically, and logically independent to support overall
business operations (Figure 3). The KPIs (i.e., Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authenticity,
Maintainability, Resiliency, Reputation, and Nonrepudiation) were discussed and agreed with the
management team. Currently, the risk management practice at Disco follows an ad hoc approach
mainly in a reactive manner, there is a very limited awareness among the staff relating to cyber security
risk management, the risk management process is not comprehensive and Disco does not collaborate
with any of its external stakeholders relating to risk management. The risk management team ranked
the existing practice as tier 1 partial. The management team agreed that, depending on the discussion,
those risks having risk a level of more than three are considered the controls and those risk levels
below three are considered within the acceptance level.
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5.4.2. Activity 2: Assets Criticality
Based on the risk management context and identified main systems, the following Table 5 shows
the asset criticality of the system components:
Table 5. Asset criticality.
Sub-System Component Impact Weight Equation (1) Criticality
SCADA application software
MS Office
Excel
Human–machine interface
9 0.81 (9  0.81) = 7.29 Reasonably critical
Operating systems Windows 7 9 0.97 (9  0.97) = 8.73 Extremely critical
Field devices
Programmable logic controller
(PLC)
Sensors
Actu tors
Remote terminal units (RTU)
7 0.69 (7  0.69) = 4.83 Reasonably critical
Smart devices Smart meter 8.7 0.99 (8.7  0.99) = 8.81 Reasonably critical
SCADA operators and users
Human resource manager
IT personnel
Senior engineer
Security advisers
Maintenance crew
Developers
4 1.00 (4  1.00) = 4.00 Reasonably critical
Customers
Government 5 0.82 (5  0.82) = 4.10 Reasonably critical
Communication and Network
infrastructure
Telephones
Radio
Cables
Satellites
Power lines
8.5 0.75 (8.5  0.95) = 8.08 Extremely critical
Host computers Master terminal unit (MTU)Servers 8.0 0.89 (8.0  0.89) = 7.12 Extremely critical
Hardware’s Supervisory computers 7 0.69 (7  0.69) = 4.85 Reasonably critical
5.4.3. Activity 3: Vulnerability Assessment and Threat Identification
Depending on the incident that happened, we discovered several vulnerable areas of the system,
such as metering challenges (estimating bills, poor meter maintenance), lack of maintenance of the
network infrastructure, and lack of firewall configuration and systems updates. By identifying the
weak points, Table 6 shows the vulnerability assessment and threats for the study context which
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affected critical assets and caused the existence of a threat which led to risk. Table 7 highlights the
impact of vulnerability for the Disco.
Table 6. Vulnerability identification checklist.
Assets Affected Potential Vulnerability VulnerabilityRanking (VR) Threats
1. SCADA operators and users
V1.1 Absence of IT personnel VR3 Breach of availability
V1.2 Insufficient security training VR3 Error in use
V1.3 Lack of monitoring mechanisms VR4 Illegal processing of data
V1.4 Lack of operator awareness VR3 Asset compromise
V1.4 Absence of maintenance crew VR3 Breach of availability
2. Communication and networks
V2.1 unprotected communication lines VR5 Eavesdropping
V2.2 lack of authorization and authentication VR5 Authorization violation
V2.3 failure to segment network VR4 Network compromise
V2.4 Lack barrier and control mechanism VR4 Bypassing controls
3. SCADA system
V3.1 No logouts when leaving the workstation VR3 Abuse of right
V3.2 Metering challenges VR3 Cheating meter reading
V3.3 Poorly designed API, website or mobile app VR3 Compromise
V3.3. Lack of documentation VR3 Error in use
V3.4 widely distributed software VR2 Corruption of data
V3.5 weak firewall VR3 Access control/forging or right
V3.6 weak user password VR3 Access control
V3.6 Denial of service VR4 Authorization violation
4. Hardware
V4.1 Unprotected storage VR2 Theft of media or document
V4.2 No spare management VR3 Breach of availability
V4.3 Equipment failure VR4 Breach of availability
5. Database V5.1 Data leakage VR3 Abuse of right
6. physical V6.1 Unstable power grid VR5 Loss of power supply
7. Organization
V7.1 Lack of disaster recovery plan VR5 Equipment failure
V7.2 lack of proper allocation of information
security responsibilities VR2 Denial of actions
V7.3 Lack of change control procedure VR3 Breach of information systemmaintainability
V7.4 Inadequate service maintenance response VR2 Breach of information systemmaintainability
Table 7. Vulnerability impact assessment.
Asset Name VulnerabilityType
Vulnerability
Rating Score (VR) Equation (3)
Vulnerability
Impact (VI)
Hardware V4.1, V4.2 3, 4 7/2 = 3.50 Low
SCADA system V3.1, V3.3, V3.5 3, 2, 4 9/3 = 3.00 Low
Communication and networks V2.3 5 5/1 = 5.00 Medium
People V1.2, V1.3 3, 4 7/2 = 3.50 Low
5.4.4. Activity 4: Risk Assessment
Step 1: Generate cyber-security attack scenario
After the identification of vulnerabilities and threats, we noticed some weaknesses in the system,
including the lack of firewalls and improper/irregular systems updates. We focused on the most
critical vulnerabilities to demonstrate some cyber-attack scenarios. Seen in Figures 4–6.
 Scenario 1: A highly skilled external attacker gained access to the master terminal unit (MTU)
of the power grid system through a remote access point exploiting the weak password and
firewall. The attacker was able to disrupt communications, access critical data such as passwords
and operating plans, and thereby, monitor the status of the system and inject malicious control
commands as well as forge data into the control center. This action led the system operators into
taking inappropriate actions that interrupted the availability of electricity.
 Scenario 2: Due to a heavy rainfall, a fallen tree branch damaged the overhead power lines
feeding the substation. This interrupted the supply causing the socket breaker for this line to trip
at the primary substation, leading to a total power outage to some parts of the area including the
local ports and few hospitals. However, the operator did not get any notification of the socket
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breaker trip and therefore did not assign the maintenance crew to the specific area of the faulty
network; this left customers without supply for 18 h.
 Scenario 3: An endpoint skilled customer who has a bakery and requires (uses more electricity),
the biggest running cost for such an operation is the electricity bill. The customer, therefore,
modifies the meter reader by cracking the smart meter password and was able to reprogram and
reset the smart meter. The dishonest customer was able to change the meter reading to a lower
value than the actual one to reduce his electricity bill.
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Step 2: Determine the likelihood of a cyber-security attack scenario
This step de ermines the likelihood, by estimating the potential attack scenario occurring
multiplied by the vulnerability impact when it occurs by following Equations (2) and (4).
 Scenario 1:
VI = V3.5VR5 + V3.6VR4 + V1.4VR3/3
VI = 13/3 = 4.33
Ri = 0.93  4.33 = 3.85
Based on scenario 1, three vulnerabilities were identified and the impact of the vulnerability is
4.33, which means that the vulnerability is medially rated. Therefore, the likelihood of the attack
scenario occurring is 3.85 and it is almost certain to occur.
 Scenario 2:
VI = V3.6VR4 + V3.4VR2 + V3.5VR3/3
VI = 9/3 = 3.00
Ri = 0.78  3.00 =2.34
Based on scenario 2, three vulnerabilities were identified and the impact of the vulnerability is
3.00, which means that the vulnerability is average. Therefore, the likelihood of the attack scenario
occurring is 2.34 and it is likely to occur.
 Scenario 3:
VI = V3.2VR3 + V1.3VR4 + V2.2VR5/3
VI = 12/3 = 4.00
Ri = 1.00  4.00 =4.00
Based on scenario 3, three vulnerabilities were identified and the impact of the vulnerability is
4.00. Therefore, the likelihood of the attack scenario occurring is 4.00 and it is almost certain
to occur.
Step 3: Determine the impact of the cyber-security attack scenario
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 Scenario 1: The attacker bridged confidentiality, availability, and integrity by disrupting
communications and gaining access to passwords, and authenticity by gaining access to the
communication systems; the reputation of the organization is at stake. The impact will be based
on the KPI bridged, and the KPI is assigned a weighted score based on a subjective judgment by
the stakeholders. Impact of the scenario is the sum of all the KPI affected and the likelihood of the
scenario occurring.
I = 0.93 + 0.61 + 0.55 + 0.71 + 0.33 = 3.13
Therefore, impact on the KPI from the likelihood of the cyber-attack scenario generated is 3.13,
which means that the impact is low.
 Scenario 2: The attack bridged the organization’s availability, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity,
maintainability, and reputation. The weight assigned to each KPI is based on the extent to which
the attack impacted the organization negatively.
I = 0.97 + 0.75 + 0.60 + 0.65 + 0.68 + 0.49 = 4.14
which means the attack impact on the organization was average.
 Scenario 3: The attacker bridged availability, confidentiality, nonrepudiation, integrity, and
authentication by resetting the smart meter and adjusting it for his own financial benefit.
I = 1.00 + 0.45 + 0.56 + 0.63 + 0.71 = 3.35
This means the attack impact is low impact to the organization, and the organization can operate
without any major breakdown.
Step 4: Identify the risk level
The risk level for each scenario generated will be the likelihood of the attack scenario generated
and the impact of the attack on the organizations KPI, by following Equation (6). Discos have agreed
to accept any risk below 3, but anything from 3 and above, the risk is controlled. The risk level for
each scenario is identified as shown below:
 Scenario 1:
RL = 3.85 + 3.13 = 6.98 (high)
 Scenario 2:
RL = 2.34 + 4.14 = 6.48 (high)
 Scenario 3:
RL = 4.00 + 3.35 = 7.35 (high)
5.4.5. Activity 5: Risk Control
Key staff of the Discos Company, including IT, were involved in this step in order to identify
control to mitigate the risks. Different controls are considered to the risks depending on the type of KPI
they have impacted and also the level of damage it has caused. The following controls were proposed
and an action plan was given to them to implement the controls in the next two months. The controls
were also discussed with the management. Seen in Table 8.
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Table 8. Security controls.
Scenario Controls
Scenario 1
C1.1 User training is required
C1.2 Strong and secure firewall configuration
C1.3 Advanced control access for data provided to ensure limited access to assets
C1.4 Strong combination of password and username
C1.5 Regular vulnerability assessments should be carried out
C1.6 Encryption of data at all times and restricted access.
Scenario 2
C2.1 Notification of events relating to occurrences is sent to customers when a power
outage occurs or likely to occur
C2.2 IT personnel security awareness programs should be I place every 6 months or yearly
C2.3 Electricity suppliers should not go out of business
C2.4 Necessary testing to confirm that the service, control process, alarm handling are
functioning and protected from risk.
Scenario 3
C3.1 Violation will lead to a legal penalty
C3.2 Monitoring users pattern and history
C3.3 Reset the default password by the provider
C3.4 Monitoring systems
C3.5 Procedure to reset passwords for the smart meter after every 6 months.
C3.6 Sign agreement with the customers
C3.7 Accurate customer usage estimation
C3.8 Tools to monitor usage of electricity accurately.
5.4.6. Activity 6: Risk Monitor and Residual Risk
The previous activity identified control actions. This activity identified the initial monitoring
activity that should be taken into consideration and the risk factors that do not have adequate controls.
However, the complete risk monitoring will be done in the future and not proposed in this paper. Seen
in Table 9.
Table 9. Risk monitor.
Risk Name Attack Scenario Affected Asset Likelihood
Unavailability of the
power supply Scenario 1 Communication systems Likely
Loss of power supply Scenario 2 Power lines Likely
Loss of revenue to the
grid Scenario 3 Smart meter Almost certain
6. Discussion
The staffs of Discos observed that the integrated risk management approach is very obliging
and detailed for asset identification, assessing potential vulnerabilities and risks. It provides a
comprehensive and holistic analysis of the critical assets, cascading vulnerabilities, and risks based
on the cyber-attack scenario generated that is relevant to the study context. Based on the studied
evaluation, the following observations have been made.
6.1. Applicability of the Approach
Several observations have been identified in regards to the applicability of the approach.
The activities presented in the process are functional and acceptable. The integrated risk management
approach provides the basics for identifying critical assets, assessing their vulnerabilities and
potential threats, and the possible risk that could disrupt the business operations. This approach
has made stakeholders aware of the possible threats that could impact their critical functions and
business operations, therefore taking the necessary actions to control threats and risk events from
occurring. Furthermore, understanding the current risk management practice within Disco, rating
it, and proposing improvements certainly created awareness at the overall organizational level.
The management of Disco planned to achieve tier 2 (risk informed) from tier 1 (partial) by implementing
the integrated risk management process in a proactive manner, prioritizing cyber security activities,
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sharing information an informal basis, and involving all departments and collaboration with
external stakeholders.
The approach is a systematic process that integrates all areas from a holistic perspective of
identifying risk which includes the stakeholders, risk types, frameworks, and the organization.
It evaluates the impact of a cyber-attack on business values, organizational functions, operations,
and other technical areas of the power grid system. There are three cyber security attack scenarios
considered from seven assets and 18 controls, that are proposed, which is comprehensive compared to
Disco’s previous risk management results. However, some of the risks that could disrupt organizations
operations include denial of service attack and unprotected communication lines. In order to
understand the risk level, the approach can assess vulnerabilities and the impact level of an attack on
the organization, using a semi-quantitative risk analysis technique.
6.2. Comparison with Existing Study Results
The results of our case study were compared with existing study results in the literature.
The integrated cyber-security risk management approach is a comprehensive approach compared to
other works from literature. A previous author Ref. [3] presented various security threats and incidents
that occurred on different critical infrastructure domains. The work introduces some security measures
including vulnerability assessments and penetration testing approaches for critical infrastructure;
however, the focus of this paper was not only on vulnerability assessment, but on how clearly risk
needs to be assessed, mitigated, and controlled. Asset identification and cascading vulnerabilities
were not considered as a result of the interdependency between assets. A previous work [36] offers an
insightful review of the possible solution paths to understand the industrial control systems security
trends in relation to cyber threats, vulnerabilities, attacks, and impacts on the industrial control system
(ICS). The work did not implement any practical approach to identify assets, assess vulnerabilities,
threats, and mitigate risks, but only suggested some techniques. Authors of a previous paper Ref. [41]
proposed a risk and vulnerability analysis method for critical infrastructure which focuses on serious
events, emphasizing dependencies between critical infrastructure sectors. However, no detailed
analysis has been carried out to uniquely identify critical assets and vulnerabilities of those assets, or
to identify those particular chains of events (cascading vulnerabilities). A previous paper Ref. [21]
proposed a unified risk management approach for a power grid system. Risk assessment, including
threat and vulnerability, as well as categorizing, was discussed, but assets were not critically identified,
cascading vulnerabilities were not considered, and controls were not put in place to mitigate the risk.
The authors of a previous paper Ref. [9] emphasized the need for a comprehensive risk management
method which covers all stages of the risk management process, our work focuses on this to improve
the cyber-security of the CPS. The authors of a previous paper Ref. [10] proposed a quantitative method
for mitigating cyber-security risk in information systems, our work quantified risk by identifying
critical assets first, then assessing vulnerabilities. Likelihood of cyber-attack scenarios were generated
to further identify the risk level and apply proper controls. The authors of a previous paper Ref. [13],
in their risk assessment process, identified some risks such as unsuspicious use of infected information
media, giving away of sensitive information, and lack of awareness. Our work identified all these risks,
including human errors, loss of power supply, unavailability of power supply, loss of revenue to the
power grid, and breach of security goals. The authors of a previous paper Ref. [15] proposed a layered
approach that evaluates risks based on security, our work evaluated risks based on cyber-attacks as
well as physical attacks and evaluates risk level and proper controls. The authors of a previous paper
Ref. [14] discussed a mechanism for preventing, detecting, and recovering attacks for securing CPS,
our work provided a mechanism for identifying critical assets, assessing cascading vulnerabilities,
generating cyber-attack scenarios, impact of the attack occurring, and provided mitigation controls to
properly secure the CPS.
None of the works provide a systematic risk management process that identifies critical assets
before assessing vulnerabilities, and also focuses on the initial vulnerability impact that leads to
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the cascading vulnerabilities effect. Our work identifies and compares the existing risk mitigation
strategies for CPS in critical infrastructure, and therefore, gives critical infrastructure organizations
a chance to perform an in-depth analysis for cyber-security on CPS. In terms of risk identification
and mitigation, there are common findings between our study and other works. The authors of a
previous paper Ref. [34] addressed risk by taking into account interdependencies and risk monitoring.
These results are completely or partly similar to the findings in our work. However, some risks,
such as energy wastage and deploying mobile cloud computing challenges, as identified [19], are not
directly similar to our studied context. Some unique risk factors that were not mentioned in other
studies include: lack of contingency plans, lack of disaster recovery, lack of monitoring mechanisms,
lack of comprehensive risk management, and initial impact of cascading vulnerability. Cascading risk
effect is the major risk in our study context, which does not match any other work. We advocated to
users and operators to not ignore their IT responsibilities because the risks in critical infrastructure
organizations depend on the context of the organization. It is also necessary to create awareness about
cyber security risks throughout the whole organizational level and its supply chain environment as
well as continuously improving and using advanced cyber security technologies to practice managing
risks and the evolution of those risks.
6.3. Limitations of the Framework
One of the observations from the participants was that it is difficult to understand the calculations
for assessing vulnerability and assuming the probability value and impact value for risk level.
Furthermore, the participants also commented about the KPIs and their link to determining impact.
It could be more challenging if the numbers of KPIs increased. We are planning to automate the
calculation and tailoring the KPI depending on the CPS context. The risk monitoring activities and
residual risks were not investigated due to the lack of time with the organization.
6.4. Study Validity
Threats relating to validity are always important for any empirical investigation. We tried to
reduce the bias of our study finding by actively involving the staff throughout the process. Data was
collected from various sources such as interviewing participants, reviewing the existing documentation,
and the organization’s internal and external context. The active of participation of key staff of the
organization also supported the precondition for action research. The management commitment to
achieve tier 2 for an informed cyber security risk management practice demonstrated the importance
of the risk management for overall business continuity. However, there is a possibility of culture bias
as data was gathered from a single geographical location. To mitigate this, we compared our findings
with other study results and observed several common and unique issues to generalize our findings.
7. Conclusions
Critical infrastructures are increasingly facing many challenges, including cybersecurity attacks.
Importantly, there are many security challenges faced by infrastructure service providers, which tend
to bring down their business operations and disrupt the continuity of their operation. An integrated
cyber-security risk management framework for the CPS of a critical infrastructure can systematically
analyze the risks and offer plans to control the risks so that business continuity can be ensured.
Every critical infrastructure should implement an effective risk management process to protect the
stakeholders from financial, organizational, and reputational loss. Our work contributes to the existing
literature by providing a comprehensive risk management approach. To demonstrate the applicability
of the work, we applied the proposed approach to a smart grid CPS. The example shows that the
approach sufficiently supports the organization to analyze their security issues, identify critical assets,
assess vulnerabilities and potential threats, and to also identify risk levels with proper controls to
mitigate risks. The results show that the approach provides information about possible vulnerabilities,
how they can cascade, and result in a bigger issue if not addressed on time. The approach considered
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seven main KPIs of the organization, and impact was calculated based on the effect of an attack on
the KPIs. Risks were analyzed using a semi quantitative approach and influenced by the likelihood
of the cyber-attack scenario occurring and the impact on the KPI of the organization to provide
accurate risk levels. The results of the risk management outcome were integrated into the study
context. The organization planned to achieve a risk-informed approach for managing overall cyber
security risks. We advocate for the creation of cyber security risk management awareness within
all organizational levels; staff must not ignore their IT responsibilities. Our future plan is to apply
the proposed approach into other case studies in order to generalize our findings and validate the
applicability of the approach. We are also planning to develop a tool to automate risk management
activities. Furthermore, it is also necessary to create a process for integrating advanced cyber security
technologies and practice for managing the risk and its evolutions.
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